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ABSTRACT
We use traffic data from a series of experiments in the United States and Israel to examine how
illegal behavior is deterred by various penalty schemes and whether deterrence varies with age, income,
driving record and criminal record. We find that red light running decreases sharply in response to an
increase in the fine or an increase in the probability of being caught. The elasticity of violations with
respect to the fine is larger for younger drivers and drivers with older cars. Drivers convicted of violent
offenses or property offenses run more red lights on average but have the same elasticity as drivers
without a criminal record. Within Israel, members of ethnic minority groups have the smallest elasticity
with respect to a fine increase.
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I.  Introduction
The economic model of crime activity suggests that potential offenders respond
to the expected value of punishment (Becker [1968], Stigler [1970], Polinsky and
Shavell [1984]).  Critics of this view have argued that many criminals are irrational,
uninformed or have such high discount rates that increases in expected punishment do
little to create deterrence.  Other researchers (e.g. Menniger [1968]) have argued that
deterrence will fail because criminals are pre-destined to commit anti-social acts due to
genes or early environment.
2
We examine a series of traffic experiments and find that increases in fines or
probability of apprehension increase deterrence for all groups of drivers, including those
convicted of violent crimes and property crimes.  The experiments are attempts by
police agencies to reduce the incidence of people driving through red lights.  The data
allow us to examine how responsive people are to shifts in the magnitude of a fine and
shifts in the probability of getting caught.  Drivers exhibit a large response to both
policy levers.   For example, the introduction of red light cameras in two U.S. cities
reduced the number of violations by about 50%.  The elasticity of violations with
respect to the size of the fine is roughly -0.20.
We find that drivers previously indicted for property or violent crimes break
traffic laws more often.  However, these drivers have as large an elasticity with respect
                                                
2 See Hernnstein and Wilson [1985] for a general discussion of theories of criminal behavior.2
to the fine increase as the general population.  Younger drivers have a larger elasticity
while wealthier drivers have a smaller elasticity
3.
Our finding that people are responsive to both the probability of apprehension
and the magnitude of the penalty is consistent with much of the modern deterrence
literature.  For example, Levitt (1998) finds that the elasticity of crime with respect to
the arrest rate is approximately -0.20.  Kessler and Levitt (1999) use sentence
enhancements to show that increases in prison sentences have a large deterrent effect.
4
Our results contrast somewhat with Grogger (1991) and Witte (1980) who find that
criminals responded very little to the magnitude of the penalty (prison sentence).
The data employed here are from a series of experiments conducted in Virginia,
California, and Israel regarding how people respond to shifts in fines and probabilities
of being caught for running red lights.  The use of data on traffic offenses rather than
data on felonies and larcenies is somewhat unusual in the economics literature, but the
data offer several advantages.
5  First, these data are from a fairly unique case in which
there is an exogenous shift in the penalty or the probability.  In two cases we have
treatment groups with shifts and control groups without shifts.  Second, in contrast to
most crime data, there is no reporting problem.  Cameras are used at each intersection to
achieve full monitoring of the number of cars and the number of violations.  Hence, the
number of reported violations is the number of actual violations.  Third, since there are
no prison sentences handed out, there are almost no concerns of untangling deterrence
                                                
3 This finding is predicted by Polinsky and Shavell [1984],  [1991] , and Garoupa [1998].
4 Erhlich [1975] examines the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
5 Becker [1968] considers the case of traffic violations as one of his examples. Other cases of the use of
traffic violations, or even red light running, as examples of crime are Polinsky and Shavell [1991],3
effects from incapacitation.
6  Fourth, we can compare the behavior of criminals and
non-criminals in their response to a fine increase.
The social losses from red light running accidents are quite large and are on the
same order of magnitude as many felonies.  Red light running is a serious problem in
virtually any country with a large number of cars and drivers. In the U.S. in 1998,
roughly 2,000 deaths resulted from drivers running red lights.
7  This compares with
about 17,000 murders in 1998 (FBI Uniform Crime Reports).  Annually there are
approximately 260,000 crashes in the U.S. caused by red light running.
8  The implied
costs of car repair alone are on the order of $520 million per year.
9
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is a brief description of the
data, while section 3 presents the empirical framework used for the micro data and
section 4 presents results. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.
                                                                                                                                              
Kaplow and Shavell [1994], and Friedman [1999]. Most economists follow the practice of Erlich [1975]
or Levitt [1998] in examining murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, larceny, or auto theft.
6 Few people lose their driver's licenses as a result of getting caught even multiple times.
7 From analysis of NHTSA administration data.  The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety estimated
that the number of deaths from red light running was 745 in 1998.  The figure of 2,000 deaths is based
upon the number of fatal accidents in which someone was charged with running a red light.
8 From US Dept. of Transportation and Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
9 This is a back of the envelope calculation based on a median car repair bill of $2000.  Clearly in
addition to the huge social costs, there could be social benefits to red light running if overall there is time
saved for drivers.   We make no effort to estimate these benefits.4
II.  Description of the Data and Experiments
To combat the problem of red light running, police agencies have taken a variety
of steps.  Among the most effective steps has been the installation of "red light
cameras" at intersections.  These are small cameras which fit inside a protective housing
installed on a light pole, tree, or building.  The camera is linked electronically to the
traffic signal and wires buried in the road.  When a car enters the intersection after the
light has turned red, the camera takes a picture of the car's license plate and in some
cases a picture of the driver.  (This depends on the requirements under local laws.)
Typically drivers have a grace period so that tickets are only issued if the car enters
some fraction of a second after the light turns red.
The cameras can be completely hidden or they can be well advertised with signs.
They are fixed in direction and one camera can only cover one direction of traffic,
though it can cover multiple lanes in a single direction.
Evidence from around the world shows that public knowledge of the use of
camera enforcement in a given area creates large reductions in the number of violations.
We have data from experiments in Fairfax, Virginia, Oxnard, California, San Francisco,
California, and Israel.
10
In Fairfax, VA, the introduction of cameras was coupled with a controlled
experiment to examine the magnitude of the drop in violations.  Prior to any public
                                                
10 The data on violations in each intersection for Fairfax and Oxnard come from traffic safety publications
by Retting et al.[1996] and [1999].  Using additional data from the Oxnard Police and Fairfax City
Planner's office, we have added information on the increase in probability of receiving a ticket and
calculated the implied elasticity of response.  The San Francisco and Israeli data were provided by the
respective police departments.5
announcement of the program, monitoring began at three types of intersections:  1.)
camera intersections in Fairfax, 2.) non-camera intersections within Fairfax, and 3.)
control intersections in nearby cities that do not use camera enforcement.  The non-
camera and control intersections were monitored using video cameras.
After several hundred hours of monitoring the level of violations, the camera
enforcement program in Fairfax was announced with a publicity campaign including
newspaper ads and signs posted at the city limits (but not specific intersections).  This
reflects increased probability of detection.  The fine imposed on red light runners was
been kept constant at $50 during the whole period under consideration. We take the
dependent variable to be the number of violations per hour.  We measure the drop in the
rate of violations as a difference in difference; we take the difference before and after at
the Fairfax camera intersections minus the difference before and after at the control
intersections.
A natural question is whether or not the timing of when the cameras are installed
is truly exogenous.  First of all differencing out the control intersections should remove
any overall trend in violations within Virginia.  Secondly, the timing of the program
was controlled more at the State level than at the local level. The State legislature had to
pass a law legalizing the use of camera enforcement.  Once they did that, Fairfax
initiated its program soon after.
A second experiment similar to the Fairfax experiment was run in Oxnard,
California at about the same time (circa July 1997).  This experiment also involved
camera and non-camera sites within Oxnard and control sites located in nearby cities6
(e.g. Santa Barbara.)  The methodology and the resulting drops in violations are similar
to those found in Fairfax.
The Oxnard experiment has an additional component: In January 1998, the State
of California more than doubled the fine for running a red light.  The fine was raised
from $104 to $271.  As is shown in Figure 1, this caused an immediate and large drop in
the number of violations per day.  The number of violations then stabilized at this new
low level where it remained.  We assume this shift in the fine to be exogenous and we
use it to obtain an estimate of the elasticity of the rate of violations with respect to the
fine.  We believe that this estimate is useful because it includes complete monitoring
and a quasi-exogenous shift in the fine.
The same fine shift occurred in San Francisco (due to the shift in California law)
and we have monthly data for eight intersections.  This enables us to run a regression
with intersection fixed effects to get a second estimate of the response to a shift in the
fine.  The time series of violations per car for the largest intersection is presented in
Figure 2.  (The fine increase occurs during month 13, i.e. the month in which the big
decline in violations/car starts.)
The largest data set we have is for Israel. In their effort to reduce traffic deaths,
the Israelis have implemented a nation wide camera program over the past twenty years.
As an additional measure to reduce violations, Israel raised the fine for running a red
light from 400 shekels ($122) to 1000 shekels ($305) in December of 1996. We have 45
months of data, 1:1995-9:1998, across all 73 intersections in the country which have
housings for the cameras.  About half of the intersections, between 34 and 40, had an
active camera in any given month. We use the Israeli data to run regressions with7
intersection fixed effects to estimate the drop in violations with respect to the fine
increase.
In addition to the aggregate data for Israel, we also have two sets of micro data
for Israeli drivers.  First, we have a panel of 21,677 drivers who had a license in 1992.
This is a random sample of 1% of Israeli drivers.   (The police created the sample for
us.)  For each driver we have age, sex, marital status, year migrated to Israel, religion,
and complete criminal and driving records.  The criminal history includes number of
arrests, indictments, and convictions for each of twelve different crimes.  We aggregate
these into property crimes, violent crimes, and white collar crimes.  From the driving
record we use the number and timing of red light violations, the number of speeding
tickets, the number of failure to yield (yield sign) violations, and the number of
convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol.  In cases where the driver has
committed a red light violation, we know the age of the driver's car.
Our second set of micro data is information on the full set of all red light tickets
issued during 1992-1999 (the "ticket based sample").  This is a set of 221,870 tickets.
For each observation we have same personal background, driving record, and criminal
history as in the 1% sample of drivers.  We also have unique driver ID numbers so that
it is clear when the same driver is getting multiple tickets.  Naturally there is some
overlap between the sample of drivers and the population of tickets.  The advantage of
the former is that we can track the behavior of all drivers including those who do not
receive red light tickets.  The advantage of the latter is that we have a much larger data
set given the entire population of tickets and we have age of car for every entry.8
III.  Empirical Framework
In the micro data, the number of red light tickets is modeled as a Poisson
process.  In other words, we assume that each driver has some fixed probability of a
ticket during a short time period and that these short periods are independent trials.   A
driver's expected number or tickets during either the before or after period is given by:
(1)  Expected number of tickets =exposure * exp( 0 b a + *after).
"After" is a dummy for whether we are using an observation from before or after
the fine increase.  "Exposure" is the length of each time period.  In this case there are 18
quarters for the before period and 14 quarters for the after period.  The expected number
of tickets in a single quarter in the before period is 
a e .  Expected tickets per quarter in
the after period = 
0 b a e
+ .  We also run specifications that include right hand side controls
for characteristics like male, married, or property criminal.  And we interact the
characteristics with "after" to allow for a differential response to the fine increase by
each group.  These equations have the following form:
(2) Expected number of tickets=
             = exposure* exp[(a+ 0 b *after+ 1 b *male+ 2 b *(male*after))].
Finally, since we observe every driver before and after the fine increase, we can
also estimate Poisson with individual fixed effects.  This specification allows each
driver to have her own base probability of a ticket.  The main effects of male, property9
criminal and other individual characteristics are absorbed into the fixed effects, but we
still can identify the coefficient on the interaction between each characteristic and
"after."  We also run the above regressions using OLS and OLS with fixed effects,
rather than Poisson. (OLS results are in Appendix I).
IV.  Results
The Response to a Shift in the Fine: Israeli Micro Data
      We begin with results for the Israeli sample of drivers.  We have a random sample
of drivers and we have their driving and criminal records for 1992-1999.  A large fine
increase for red light violations was announced near the end June of 1996.  We define a
"before increase" period as being January 1992-June 1996.  The "after" period is July
1996-December 1999. 
11
In Table 1, we see that the mean number of tickets per driver during the before
period was .092.
12   5.3 percent of the sample had been indicted for a property crime by
1992.  4.7 percent had been indicted for a violent crime and 3.4% for a white collar
crime.  Eighty-nine percent of the sample is Jewish while 76 percent are male and 81
percent are married.  Fourteen and one half percent are aged 17-30 in 1992 and 26
percent are age 31-40.  Four percent migrated to Israel within the past 20 years.
In Table 2, for various groups we show the mean number of tickets before and
after the fine increase.  The groups shown include the whole sample, the property
                                                
11 We tried using other months, e.g. January 1997, as the first month of the “after” period. This did not
make a significant change in the estimated elasticities.
12 The raw decrease in number of tickets per driver is from .092 in the before period to .05 in the after
period.  This decrease does not control for the differing lengths of the two periods.  Table 2 truncates the
earlier period to 14 quarters and there we see that  tickets per driver decreases from .073 to .050.10
criminals, women, men, unmarried people, Jews, and non-Jews.  For this table only, we
truncate the before period (from below) so that it is the same length as the after period
(i.e. 14 quarters).  The table shows that drivers who have criminal indictments, or who
are young, unmarried, or recently immigrated run more red lights than others.  We also
calculate an implied elasticity with respect to the fine increase using the change in
tickets per driver and the fact that the fine increase was 150%.
13
Table 2 shows that the elasticity of number of tickets with respect to the fine
increase is -.21 with a standard error of .02.  Property criminals have a slightly larger
point estimate of the elasticity than non-criminals.  However, this difference is not
significant.  Non-jews have an elasticity of -.10 which is significantly smaller than the -
.23 elasticity for the Jews.  People ages 17-30 have an elasticity of -.36 which is much
larger than the -.16 for people older than 30.  This latter difference is highly significant.
Figures 3 through 5 show the effects of the fine increase for the whole sample
and for several subgroups.  Figure 3 shows a time series of total number of tickets
obtained by quarter.  There is a downward break in the number of tickets after June
1996 (quarter 18), i.e. just after the fine increase was announced.  Before and after the
fine increase, there are several very large rises and falls that follow a seasonal pattern
with tickets being lowest in the fourth calendar quarter and highest in the summer.
14
But ignoring the seasonal issue, the graph shows a downward shift in the series before
and after June 1996 (quarter 18).
                                                
13 To obtain the standard errors for these elasticities, for each group we run a Poisson regression of
number of tickets on a dummy for "after."  The z-statistic on the incidence ratio for "after" is the z-
statistic for the elasticity.11
Figure 4 splits the sample by drivers ages 17-30 versus 31+ and shows tickets
per driver per year over time.  (The young drivers get so many more tickets per driver
that we use a log scale to show the two lines on the same graph.)   The figure shows that
young drivers experience a big decrease in tickets starting in 1996.  Older drivers also
show some decrease in tickets per driver after the fine increase, though the effect is
much smaller.  Figure 5 shows similar time series for the Jews and the non-Jews in the
sample.  From 1992-1995, both groups have similar levels of tickets per driver.  But,
after the fine increase the Jews appear to have a larger decrease than do the non-Jews.
Table 3 uses the same sample of drivers and shows Poisson regressions of
number of tickets on driver characteristics and driver characteristics interacted with the
dummy for "after" the increase.  In column (1), the coefficient on "after" is -.381 and is
highly significant.    In other words, after the fine increase, drivers experience roughly a
38% reduction in the number of tickets per quarter.
15   [The justification for this
approximation is as follows: Suppose expected number of tickets = exposure*exp(-5.2 -
.381*after).  Take the natural log of both sides. When after=1, the fitted value for
ln(tickets) is decreased by -.381.]
16
In column (2) we add driver characteristics.  Drivers aged 17-30 in 1992 receive
73% more tickets relative to the base category of drivers age 51+.  This difference is
highly significant with a z-statistic of 13.4.  Persons with speeding tickets, stop sign
                                                                                                                                              
14 In particular, there is a big drop in the number of tickets between quarters 15 and 16, prior to the fine
increase.  This drop is similar in magnitude to earlier seasonal drops and does not necessarily imply a
break in the process.
15  We control for the lengths of the before and after periods by setting exposure equal to 18 quarters and
14 quarters respectively.  Thus our coefficients are interpreted as the effect on ln(number tickets in a
given quarter).
16 The true percentage decrease in number of tickets is  1-e^-.38 = -31.6%.  We suggest the approximation
to provide an easy interpretation of the Poisson coefficients.12
tickets, criminal records, and those who have migrated to Israel within the past 20 years
all receive substantially more tickets.  (The immigrant effect could also be partially an
age effect.)  Property criminals receive 22 percent more tickets than non-criminals.  The
main effect of the dummy for Jewish is small and insignificant.
Column (3) adds interactions between driver characteristics and the dummy for
the fine increase.  (In other words, we allow the different types of drivers to have a
differential response to the fine increase.)    Only two of the interaction terms are
statistically significant.  Young drivers (age 17-30 in 1992) have a significantly larger
response to the fine increase relative to drivers who are 51+.  The coefficient on the
interaction of after*young is -.635 which eliminates 2/3 the base difference between
young and old drivers.  Part of this large negative interaction term may stem from the
fact that the young drivers age modestly between the before and after periods.  (In the
current draft, we do not report results controlling for this aging effect, but the aging is
not enough to be driving the result.)
The other significant interaction term is for after*Jewish.  Jews have a bigger
response to the fine increase than do non-Jews.  The total decrease in tickets for Jews is
-.30 or about a 30% drop controlling for age and all other explanatory variables.  The
decrease in tickets for the non-Jews is only 3%.  One interpretation of this result is that
the non-Jews in Israel were less aware of the increase in the fine.  Or the non-Jews may
have less intention to pay traffic tickets they receive, so they have a lower price
elasticity.
  The most interesting result is that the interactions between "after" and the
various crime dummies are insignificant.  This indicates that drivers with criminal13
records have the same response to the fine increase as the non-criminals.  This holds
true for property criminals, violent criminals and white collar criminals.  This result is
consistent with the base elasticities in Table 2 which are similar for criminals and non-
criminals.  So, the criminals appear to have the same "rational" response to the fine
increase as anyone else.  One might expect that the criminals have less wealth and
would therefore be more deterred by a fine increase.  But this wealth effect could be
offset by if the criminals are somewhat less likely to pay the fine.
Column (4) of Table 3 adds individual fixed effects.  This allows us to estimate
the coefficient on the interaction between after and individual characteristics while
holding each person's probability of a ticket constant.
17   In the fixed effects
specification, the interactions of after*Jew and after*young remain significant.  The
interactions between after and the crime dummies remain insignificant.
Tables 4 and 5 switch from the random sample of Israeli drivers to the entire
universe of red light tickets between 1992 and 1999.  Table 4 shows the mean of each
driver characteristic (across the tickets) in the before and after periods.  The means in
Table 4 confirm the results from the driver sample.  In the before period, 7% of the
tickets are received by drivers indicted for a property crime.  In the after period, 6.3% of
tickets are given to property criminals.  This modest decrease in the share of tickets
shows that if anything, property criminals are slightly more sensitive to the fine increase
relative to non-criminals.
                                                
17 Poisson with fixed effects causes observations with no tickets in either period to drop out of the
regression, so the sample size is reduced to 5,244 drivers.14
The share of tickets issued to young drivers drops from 31% to 21% which
confirms the larger elasticity for young drivers found earlier.
18  Jews see a modest
decrease in their share of tickets following the fine increase (from 88% to 84%).  This
implies a fairly large percentage increase in the share of tickets for non-Jews from 12%
to 16%.
The average age of the car used in the violation falls slightly from 6.1 years to
5.9 years from the before to the after period.  We interpret this to mean that drivers with
newer cars are somewhat less responsive to the fine increase.  Though, another
possibility is that average age of car driven in Israel is falling over time.
We transform the ticket based data to make the unit of observation an individual
driver (instead of an individual ticket).  The resulting data are the set of all drivers who
received at least one red light ticket during the before period.  For this group we model
the number of tickets received during the before and after periods.  The advantage of
this approach (relative to our random sample of all drivers) is that we have a much
larger sample of people, all of whom received at least one ticket.  This allows us to
obtain more precise estimates of the effects of the fine increase.
Table 5 shows a series of Poisson regressions using the above data.  (These
regressions are analogous to those in Table 3 but use the larger, differently selected
sample.)  In column (1), we see that the number of tickets drops by 34% in the after
period.  This coefficient is similar to the decrease of 38% found in column (1) of Table
3.  Column (3) adds personal characteristics interacted with the dummy for "after."  The
coefficients on after* the three crime dummies are all negative and significant.  The
                                                
18 The ticket based sample allows drivers to enter and leave the sample as they age.  So, the finding for15
coefficients range from -.07 for the interaction of after with the property crime dummy
to -.18 for the interaction of after with the white collar crime dummy.  This indicates
that criminals actually have a larger response to the fine increase than everyone else.
The interaction between after and age 17-30 is -.69 with a z-statistic of 43.6.
This confirms that young people have a larger elasticity with respect to the fine
increase
19.  The interaction between "after" and "car is less than 5 years old" is .12 with
a z-stat of 13.5.  This shows that holding driver characteristics constant, people with
newer cars are less responsive to the fine increase.  The simplest explanation for this
finding is that wealthier people are less sensitive to the fine increase because the fine is
a smaller percentage of their wealth or disposable income.  Column (4) adds driver
specific fixed effects.  The coefficients are virtually unchanged from column (3).
Results Using Aggregate Data
Now we switch to examining aggregate data collected by police agencies in the
US and Israel.  In Table 6 we see how the total number of violations responded to the
installation of cameras in Fairfax, Virginia.  We look at violations per hour rather than
per driver because we have exact information on hours of camera operation and only
annual estimates on traffic flows.  Town estimates show that traffic levels are roughly
similar in the before and after periods, so the transformation to violations per hour
should not matter much for our conclusions.  In row 1, we see that violations per hour
                                                                                                                                              
younger drivers is not an artifact of a fixed sample of drivers getting older.16
fell by 45% in the camera intersections one year after the cameras were introduced.
Violations per hour fell by 29% in non-camera intersections in Fairfax.  This reflects the
fact that the locations of the cameras are not public knowledge.  Both drops are large
and statistically significant.  Virtually no drop is recorded in the control intersection;
nor would we expect one.  The diff in diff (treatment change minus control change)
shows a 50% reduction in the camera intersections and a 34% reduction in the non-
camera.  Both drops are statistically significant.
Using a very rough approximation, we estimate the probability of apprehension
before the program at 1.1% (see Table 2, row 6).  This is the ratio of actual tickets hand
written in 1996 to violations in 1997 in the intersections that were fully monitored pre-
treatment.  During the pre-treatment period, these intersections were monitored with a
camera in 1997 (even though tickets were not being given).  We assume that the number
of violations in 1996 is identical to those recorded in the pre-treatment monitoring in
1997.  This yields the estimate of a 1.1% chance of apprehension.
We then estimate how much the probability of apprehension rose from the
installation of the cameras.  We know that each camera can only cover one approach to
an intersection.  We assume that the presence of a camera raises the probability of
apprehension for that approach to 100% but that drivers do not know which
intersections and approaches are covered by cameras.  The new probability of
apprehension is estimated to be 1.1% + (# of cameras/ # major approaches in the city).
This implies a new probability of apprehension of 3.6% which is 223% increase.
                                                                                                                                              
19 And the coefficients from the two samples are very similar.17
The elasticity with respect to probability of apprehension is then either -.22 if
you consider the drop in violations for the camera intersections or -.15 if you consider
the drop for the non-camera intersections.
  Table 7 repeats this exercise for the data from the Oxnard, California
experiment.  We switch from violations per hour to violations per car because we have
different data from Oxnard.  In the nine camera intersections, there is a drop of 44% in
violations per car in the camera intersections and 54% in the non-camera intersections
in Oxnard.  The decrease in the control intersections is 5% and is not statistically
significant.  The diff in diff shows decreases of 39% and 49% in the camera and non-
camera intersections respectively.  All drops in camera and non-camera sites are
statistically significant.
In Table 8 we examine how aggregate violations respond to an increase of 150%
in the fine in Israel (from 400 to 1000 shekels) and 161% in California (from $104 to
$271).  Here the cameras function solely as a way to get complete monitoring of various
intersections before and after the fine shift.
The first four columns of Table 8 present regression results using the Israeli
data.  In regression 2 we regress the log of violations per day on the log of the fine,
using the single large shift in the fine to identify the coefficient.  We use intersection
months as the unit of observation and include intersection fixed effects.  We estimate
the elasticity of the violation rate with respect to the fine to be -0.17.   When we
aggregate up to quarterly data as in regression 1, we see that the elasticity of violations
with respect to the fine is -0.21.  In both regressions the elasticity is statistically
significant.18
In regression 3 we included the number of months since the camera was first
installed in the intersection. The coefficient of this variable is intended to capture the
degree to which drivers learn about the locations of the cameras and reduce violations in
those specific intersections. This coefficient is -0.02 and is statistically significant.
In regression 4 we made an attempt to estimate the effect of an exogenous shift
in the probability of an accident. For that purpose we included the number of
intersecting roads (one or two) in each intersection.  A larger number of intersecting
roads creates a larger probability of having an accident while running a red light.  The
coefficient of this variable is negative and significant, which indicates that the violation
rate falls with a higher probability of an accident.
In regression 6 in Table 8, we use the aggregate data in Oxnard to estimate the
response to the fine increase and obtain an elasticity of -0.56. Naturally we worry about
the fact that the shift in the fine came within a year after the cameras went into place.
But as Figure 1 demonstrates, the drop occurs directly after the fine change. In San
Francisco we have individual intersection data by month and so we are able to run a
panel regression with intersection fixed effects.  In the case of San Francisco (regression
5) we estimate elasticity of the violation rate with respect to the fine is -0.26.
Our results from aggregate data can be summarized as follows:  Introduction of
red light cameras that increased the probability of ticketing reduced the number of
violations in both Oxnard and Fairfax to about one half of the pre-camera levels.  Fine
increases in California and Israel lowered the number of violations such that the
elasticity of violations with respect to the fine hike is around –0.20. We have also found19
some indication that exogenous increase in the probability of an accident reduces the
number of violations.
Additional Caveats and Interpretation of Results
Thus far we have only considered the one time cost of the traffic fine when
calculating the percentage change in the cost of a red light ticket.  In reality, there are
other costs to receiving a ticket including increased insurance premiums, time costs, and
feelings of guilt.  If we include these other costs into our calculations of the elasticity,
we would estimate higher elasticities (since the fine shift becomes a smaller percentage
change of the base cost of a ticket).
For example, in California a single traffic ticket would raise the insurance
premiums of the average driver by approximately $160 per year for three years.
20  At a
discount rate of 8 percent, this is a present value of $445.  The fine shifted from $104 to
$271, but the total costs (fine plus insurance costs) shifted from $549 to $716 or a 30.4
percent increase.  If we then run the same regression for San Francisco as in Table 8,
but use the shift in total costs versus the shift in the fine only, we obtain as elasticity of
violations with respect to total costs of -.94 (versus the -.26 for the fine only).
So, which number is the best estimate?  We prefer the lower estimate for several
reasons.  First, the insurance costs may be overstated.  Violators may use driving school
to avoid the insurance costs, or may be relying on their parents to pay for car insurance,
or may already be paying the maximum rate on their insurance due to previous
violations.  Secondly, the Israeli data do not contain this problem of insurance rates20
rising with tickets.  And the various data sets from Israel deliver robust estimates of the
fine elasticity that are in the -.20 to -.30 range.
Our analysis focuses on the reduction in violations that results from increases in
fines and probability of apprehension.  The percentage change in accidents and fatalities
with respect to the fine may be different than the percentage change in violations.
Suppose there are two types of violators.  Type one violators are those who sneak
through lights at the end of a cycle only when they are certain that there is no oncoming
traffic.  Type two violators are those who drive at high speed through an intersection
with no concern for safety or the presence of drivers coming from intersecting roads.  If
Type one violators are the entire source of reduction in violations, but type two drivers
cause all the fatal accidents, then violations may fall without affecting fatalities.
Existing studies indicate that the number of accidents and fatalities does fall
along with the number of red light violations that occurs from the introduction of
cameras.  For example, the San Francisco Department of Parking and Traffic claims
that red light enforcement provided a 42 percent reduction in violations per month and a
10 percent reduction in red light running accidents over a six month period.  Oxnard
experienced a 32 percent reduction in "front into side" collisions after cameras were
introduced. (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety).  These numbers confirm that
accidents fall with violations, though it is unclear whether accidents actually decrease as
much with violations (as they appear to in Oxnard) or fall by a smaller percentage (as in
San Francisco).
                                                                                                                                              
20 This was estimated by USAA Property and Casualty.  Note that the median driver may be different that
the median violator.21
A natural question to ask is whether the results imply anything about risk
aversion, risk neutrality or risk loving behavior on the part of drivers.  Our estimates of
the elasticity of violations with respect the probability of getting caught (-.22) and the
size of the fine (-.21 from Israel) are so similar that the numbers are certainly consistent
with risk neutrality.
21   However, given the imprecision of the first elasticity estimate
and the possible downward biases to the second estimate (discussed above), we are
unable to reject risk aversion or risk loving behavior on the part of drivers.
V.  Conclusion
We have used data from several experiments to show that additional deterrence
is created both by increases in fines and by the probability of being caught.  People's
behavior seems quite similar across various cities in the US and in Israel.  Interestingly,
in comparison to non-criminals, people with criminal records are just as sensitive (or
even more sensitive) to changes in the magnitude of the fine.  This evidence supports
the view that criminals make rational choices regarding law breaking activities and that
criminals respond to incentives with a finite discount rate.
Young people and people with older cars respond to fine increases more than
older people and people with new cars.  This suggests that a driver's perception of the
fine is relative to one's own wealth and that the optimal fine might be one based (in
part) on the wealth of the perpetrator.  Our results support the point made by Polinsky
                                                
21 For example, if we have a 10 percent decrease in the fine coupled with a 10 percent increase in
probability of apprehension so as to keep the expected fine roughly constant, there is no effect on
violations.22
and Shavell [1991]
22 regarding deterrence, its relationship to wealth and the optimal
level of fines.  The simplest theory of deterrence would suggest that the socially optimal
fine is a maximal one imposed with low probability as in Becker (1968).  But if the
level of the fine must be constant for all drivers and wealth varies greatly, the optimal
fine may substantially less than maximal.
23
Overall, the empirical work is quite supportive of the economic model of crime.
The results offer further reason to believe that policy makers have effective tools at their
disposal to combat crime and that changes in deterrence may be able to explain changes
in crime rates.
                                                
22 See also Garoupa [1998].
23 Note that if the fine is larger than the wealth of the poorest people, an increase in the fine coupled with
a decrease in probability of detection would reduce deterrence for those people.23
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Table 1
Means in Israeli Sample of Drivers
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
number of red light tickets (before) 21677 0.092 0.324 0 5
property criminal 21677 0.053 0.223 0 1
violent criminal 21677 0.047 0.212 0 1
white collar criminal 21677 0.034 0.182 0 1
dwi indictment 21677 0.004 0.062 0 1
stop sign tickets 21677 0.707 1.064 0 12
jew 21608 0.891 0.311 0 1
male 21625 0.755 0.430 0 1
married 21677 0.812 0.391 0 1
age 17-30 21677 0.145 0.352 0 1
age 31-40 21677 0.263 0.440 0 1
age 41-50 21677 0.279 0.449 0 1
migrated <20 years ago 21677 0.042 0.200 0 1
speeding tickets 21677 1.333 1.804 0 27
age of car 2995 6.168 5.393 0 47
The data are from a 1% random sample of all Israeli drivers.  The mean of red light tickets is .05 in the after period.27
Table 2
Mean Number of Tickets By Various Groups
(Before Period Truncated to 14 Quarters)
The table shows the mean number of tickets (ie tickets per driver) during a 14 quarter period before the fine increase
and a 14 quarter period after the fine increase.  The rows show the means for various subgroups of the data including
criminals, men and women, and various age categories.
Before Increase After Increase Elasticity
(std error)
All drivers 0.073 0.050 -0.21
(0.02)
No criminal indictment --property 0.071 0.048 -0.22
(0.02)
Criminal indictment-- property 0.119 0.074 -0.25
(0.09)
Criminal indict--violent 0.102 0.078 -0.16
(0.10)
Criminal indict -- white collar 0.095 0.093 -0.01
(0.05)
Female 0.065 0.042 -0.24
(0.04)
Male 0.076 0.052 -0.21
(0.02)
Unmarried 0.093 0.057 -0.26
(0.04)
Married 0.068 0.048 -0.20
(0.02)
Not recent migrant 0.072 0.049 -0.21
(0.03)
Recent migrant (20 yrs) 0.102 0.057 -0.29
(0.04)
Non-jew 0.071 0.060 -0.10
(0.07)
Jew 0.074 0.049 -0.23
(0.02)
Age 31+ 0.065 0.049 -0.16
(0.03)
Age 17-30 0.123 0.056 -0.36
(0.04)
Notes: Before and after periods are each 14 quarters long.  Standard errors are computed by using the z- stat from a
separate Poisson regression of number of tickets on a dummy for "after" for each group of drivers.28
Table 3: Poisson Regressions
The table uses individual micro data on Israeli drivers.  These are Poisson regressions in which the dependent
variable is the number of tickets obtained by a given driver.  The order of the regressions is as follows: 1 = baseline
regression; 2 = adds driver characteristics ; 3= with interactions for characteristics ; 4= with interactions & person
fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
number red lights number red lights number red lights number red lights
after increase -0.381 -0.380 -0.034 -0.059
(10.03)** (9.98)** (0.18) (0.31)
age 17-30 0.729 0.931
(13.38)** (14.11)**
age 31-40 0.202 0.261
(3.89)** (4.00)**
age 41-50 0.203 0.214
(4.07)** (3.36)**
criminal indictment property 0.221 0.289
(3.10)** (3.27)**
criminal indictment violent 0.180 0.159
(2.35)* (1.64)
criminal indictment white collar 0.158 0.060
(1.84) (0.53)
# of dwi -0.260 -0.258







migrated <20 yrs ago 0.444 0.532
(5.68)** (5.74)**
no yield violations in 1992 0.241 0.241
(5.15)** (5.14)**
number speeding tickets in 1992 0.091 0.081
(11.84)** (8.20)**
stop sign tickets in 1992 0.185 0.185
(13.68)** (13.69)**
after *married -0.047 0.008
(0.50) (0.09)
after*speeding tix 0.025 0.031
(1.74) (1.88)
after*age 17-30 -0.635 -0.645
(5.39)** (5.44)**
after*age 31-40 -0.160 -0.169
(1.49) (1.56)29
















after*stop sign violations -0.022
(0.70)
after*yield sign violations 0.077
(0.78)
Constant -5.276 -5.780 -5.909
(235.65)** (64.49)** (52.91)**
Observations 43354 43210 43210 5244
Number of id 2622
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level30
Table 4
Means in Sample of Tickets
The table shows means of driver characteristics from the entire universe of red light tickets issued during 1992-
1999.
before after
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean
property criminal 143198 0.070 0.256 0 1 78672 0.063
violent criminal 143198 0.060 0.238 0 1 78672 0.054
white collar criminal 143198 0.035 0.185 0 1 78672 0.030
yield sign violations 143198 0.140 0.347 0 1 78672 0.124
car <5 years old 143180 0.484 0.500 0 1 78670 0.495
age of car 143180 6.139 5.448 0 61 78670 5.901
dwi 143198 0.005 0.072 0 1 78672 0.004
jew 142711 0.876 0.329 0 1 78450 0.841
male 143198 0.746 0.436 0 1 78672 0.753
married 143198 0.738 0.440 0 1 78672 0.685
migrated <20 years 143198 0.644 0.479 0 1 78672 0.682
age 17-30 112220 0.305 0.460 0 1 52334 0.213
age 31-40 112220 0.247 0.431 0 1 52334 0.232
age 41-50 112220 0.234 0.423 0 1 52334 0.265
age 51+ 112220 0.214 0.410 0 1 52334 0.290
age 112220 39.875 13.948 16 94 52334 43.36931
Table 5
Sample of All Drivers Who Received a Ticket
Poisson Regressions
Here we take the universe of tickets and create a sample in which the unit of observation is the individual driver.
However, drivers are only in the sample if they received a red light ticket during 1992-1999.
1 =basic
2 = with characteristics
3= with additional characteristics on driving record and criminal record
4= interact after w/ characteristics
5= interact after w/ characteristics, add individual fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
number red lights number red lights number red lights number red lights
after increase -0.339 -0.508 -0.010 -0.019
(76.36)** (95.83)** (0.37) (0.74)
age 17-30 -0.015 0.202
(2.14)* (23.02)**
age 31-40 -0.005 0.116
(0.71) (13.04)**
age 41-50 -0.009 0.048
(1.31) (5.32)**






















migrated <20 yrs ago 0.050 0.142
(4.70)** (11.50)**












after*age 17-30 -0.688 -0.691
(43.62)** (43.48)**
after*age 31-40 -0.350 -0.35132
(22.92)** (22.91)**
after*age 41-50 -0.153 -0.153
(10.33)** (10.28)**




























after*white collar -0.176 -0.177
(6.53)** (6.50)**
Constant -3.221 -3.184 -3.363
(1213.58)** (258.44)** (227.11)**
Observations 395116 290870 290870 290870
Number of id 14543533
Table 6
Reduction in Violations, Implied Elasticities
From Fairfax, VA Experiment






Camera 0.59 0.33 -45%
(0.13) (0.09) (9%)
N 5.00 5.00 5.00
Non-camera 1.96 1.35 -29%
(0.58) (0.29) (6%)
N 2.00 2.00 2.00
Control 0.36 0.37 5%
(0.05) (0.02) (9%)
N 2.00 2.00 2.00
Difference in Difference
Camera minus Control -50%
(16%)
Non-camera minus control -34%
(11%)
Probability of Apprenhension
tickets per violation 0.011 0.036 223%
(0.005)
Elasticity of Violations per hour wrt  ∆ Prob
Camera minus Control -0.22
Non-camera minus control -0.15
Notes:
Data provided by City of Fairfax Dept. of Public Works and Police Dept; Insurance for Highway Safety.
Intersection specific data are provided in Retting et. al. 1998.  We have added standard errors, estimates of
the probability of apprehension and estimates of the elasticity.
Standard errors shown in parentheses.  Violations per hour are averages across intersections.
Standard error shown is std(across intersections) / (n^.5)
Standard error for diff in diff is calculated as the standard error for a difference in means.
Probability of apprehension before = [annual number of tickets written (hand enforcement) at the 5
intersections used as "camera" intersections] / [annual number of violations -- estimated from "before" data
collected during experiment]34
Table 7
Reduction in Violations, Implied Elasticities
From Oxnard, CA Experiment






Camera 14.35 8.38 -44%
(1.72) (1.37) (5%)
N 9.00 9.00 9.00
Non-camera 16.40 7.40 -54%
(6.13) (3.22) (8%)
N 3.00 3.00 3.00
Control 7.00 6.70 -5%
(0.20) (1.20) (14%)
N 2.00 2.00 2.00
Difference in Difference
Camera minus Control -39%
(13%)
Non-camera minus control -49%
(19%)
Probability of Apprehension
tickets per violation 200%
Elasticity of Violations per hour wrt  ∆ Prob
Camera minus Control -0.20
Non-camera minus control -0.25
Notes:
Data are from Oxnard Police Dept and Retting et. al. 1999 which contains raw data for each intersection.
Standard errors shown in parentheses.  Violations per car are averages across intersection.
Standard error shown is std(across intersections) * 1/ (n)^.5
Standard error for diff in diff is calculated as the standard error for a difference in means.35
Table 8
Regression of Violations Per Day On Indicators For Shift in Fine





























































R-squared .12 .08 .14 .13 .05 .56
N
(time periods*intersections)
589 1,519 1,519 675 124 21
Notes:
T-statistics in parentheses.
Regressions 1-4 are OLS with intersection fixed effects on Israeli data.
Fine shifts in 1/12/96 from 400 shekels to 1,000 shekels.
Number of intersections is 73 in regressions 1-3, 32 in regression 4 (rural intersections only) and 8 in regression 5.
Regression 5 is OLS with intersection fixed effects on San Francisco, CA data.
Regression 6 is OLS on aggregate Oxnard, CA data.
Fine shifts in CA from $104 to $271 on 1/1/98.36
Appendix Table 1: OLS Regressions with Israeli Drivers Sample
1 = baseline
2 = with characteristics
3= with additional characteristics on driving record and criminal record
4= interact after w/ characteristics
5= interact after w/ characteristics, add individual fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
number red lights number red lights number red lights number red lights number red lights
after increase -0.043 -0.043 -0.043 -0.001 -0.001
(15.86)** (15.92)** (15.96)** (0.11) (0.11)
age 17-30 0.049 0.057 0.100
(11.27)** (12.99)** (16.07)**
age 31-40 0.008 0.013 0.022
(2.13)* (3.60)** (4.21)**
age 41-50 0.011 0.013 0.016
(2.99)** (3.55)** (3.27)**
criminal indictment property 0.030 0.021 0.034
(4.81)** (3.35)** (3.83)**
jew 0.004 0.006 0.018
(1.00) (1.44) (2.75)**
male -0.004 -0.010 -0.014
(1.33) (2.88)** (2.92)**
married -0.014 -0.013 -0.015
(3.93)** (3.56)** (3.04)**
migrated <20 yrs ago 0.037 0.037 0.060
(5.38)** (5.33)** (6.17)**


























after*age 17-30 -0.085 -0.085
(9.72)** (10.02)**
after*age 31-40 -0.017 -0.017
(2.35)* (2.43)*












after*white collar 0.018 0.018
(1.18) (1.22)
Constant 0.092 0.070 0.056 0.035 0.092
(47.87)** (10.48)** (8.32)** (3.76)** (49.84)**
Observations 43354 43216 43216 43216 43216
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.5438
Appendix Table 2
Israeli Driver's Sample Without Trucation of Before Period
Mean Number of Tickets By Various Groups
Before Increase After Increase
All drivers 0.092 0.050
No criminal indictment --property 0.089 0.048
Criminal indictment-- property 0.138 0.074
Criminal indict--violent 0.123 0.078





Not recent migrant 0.09 0.049
Recent migrant (20 yrs) 0.144 0.057
Non-jew 0.088 0.060
Jew 0.093 0.049
Age 17-30 0.159 0.056
Notes: Before period is 18 quarters long and after period is 14 quarters long39
Figure 1
Violations Per Day in Oxnard, CA
Notes: Violations per day = (total violation all intersections / hours of observation all intersections) * 24








































































































































Violations Per Car in San Francisco, CA
Data provided by San Francisco Department of Parking and Traffic.  Data are from the camera at 19th and Sloat





Number of Red Light Tickets Per Quarter: Israeli Drivers Sample
Figure 4
Red Light Tickets Per Driver Per Year: Israeli Drivers Sample
Bold line Drivers 17-30, Thin Line: All Others42
Figure 5
Red Light Tickets Per Driver Per Year: Israeli Drivers Sample
Bold line: Jews, Thin Line: All Others
Figure 6
Number of Red Light Tickets Per Quarter: Israeli Tickets Sample